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Laffer Traps and Monetary Policy
Patrick A. Pintus
This article focuses on the interaction, in a stylized economy with flexible prices, of monetary
and fiscal policy when both are active—active in the sense that how the policy instrument is set
depends on the state of the economy. Fiscal policy finances a given stream of government expen-
ditures through distortionary labor taxes, and it operates under a strict balanced-budget rule. If
monetary policy is passive, the economy may occasionally switch, because of self-fulfilling expec-
tations, from the neighborhood of a “Laffer trap” equilibrium to the saddle-path leading to the high-
welfare steady state. In the low-welfare stationary state, output, investment, and consumption are
low while the tax rate is correspondingly high. However, active monetary policy may, by following
a rule such that the nominal interest rate responds positively to the state of the economy, push the
economy toward the high-welfare equilibrium and rule out expectation-driven business cycles.
(JEL E32, E63, H31)
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low—is Pareto-dominated by the high steady
state and it is subject to expectation-driven busi-
ness cycles. The main point of this article is to
argue that switching to an active monetary policy
may push the economy toward the high-welfare
equilibrium and rule out expectation-driven
business cycles. This happens, for instance, if
the monetary authority follows a simple rule
that stipulates how the nominal rate of interest
responds to today’s state of the economy.
This article obviously belongs to the vast liter-
ature that contrasts the effects of Friedman-type
and Taylor-type monetary policy rules. It provides
a simple example in which substituting a state-
contingent policy for a passive rule may lead to
better macroeconomic outcomes, in accord with
the lesson one may draw from many articles in
this area. However, in contrast with most of the
recent research, the economy I focus on is not
subject to the controversial sticky-price assump-
T
his article focuses on the interaction,
in a stylized economy with flexible
prices, of monetary and fiscal policy
when both are active—active in the
sense that the policy instrument depends on the
state of the economy. The fiscal authority has to
finance a given stream of government expendi-
tures that is constant over time, reflecting some
social needs to smooth out the production of
public goods. To that end, the government levies
distortionary taxes on labor income, but it does
so under a strict rule that imposes a balanced
budget in each period. As a consequence, the tax
rate is countercyclical. Suppose that monetary
policy is passive (e.g., that it keeps the rate of
money growth constant over time). Then the
economy possesses two steady states: one with
a high tax rate (a “Laffer trap” equilibrium) and
one with a low tax rate. The low stationary state—
where output, investment, and consumption are
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type of indeterminacy that is associated with
passive policy (but eliminated by active policy)
does not strictly depend on that assumption and
may occur in a world where all prices are flexible.
I first show how a Laffer trap occurs when a
given stream of government expenditures is
financed by distortionary taxes and when the
growth rate of the money supply is held constant
over time. More precisely, I show that the econ-
omy has a low steady state, associated with a tax
rate that is higher than the level that maximizes
government revenues (which I call the Laffer
maximal tax rate). It coexists with a high station-
ary state where consumption, investment, and
output are higher. As a consequence, the higher
stationary equilibrium is characterized by larger
welfare and it Pareto-dominates the low steady
state. Moreover, the high steady state is saddle-
point stable while the Laffer trap is locally inde-
terminate, so that sunspot equilibria occur near
the low steady state. Most importantly, regime
switching occurs when the economy occasionally
jumps between the saddle-path (which converges
monotonically toward the high steady state) and
volatile paths around the Laffer trap. The main
mechanism giving rise to indeterminacy is that
households supply labor today according to
their expectations about the inflation rate. More
precisely, labor supply is higher (lower) when
expected inflation is lower (higher). Consequently,
waves of optimism or pessimism turn out to be
self-confirming and the economy may experience
excess volatility in the absence of any shocks to
“fundamentals.”
Second, I show that an active monetary policy
may, by committing to a rule that links the nomi-
nal interest rate to output, push the economy
toward the high-welfare equilibrium and rule out
expectation-driven business cycles. One may think
about this second type of policy as motivated by
inflation targeting, which is designed to avoid
large fluctuations of the inflation rate associated
with indeterminacy. Alternatively, one may view
this regime as originated by a max-min criterion
that guides monetary policy and that aims at
eliminating the “worst” equilibrium because it
has both low welfare and excess volatility.
The analysis builds upon earlier work by
introducing active fiscal and monetary policies
in Woodford’s (1986) framework. It complements
the analysis of Leeper (1991), Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (1997), and Antinolfi, Azariadis, and
Bullard (2007) in the sense that I combine all
elements of these studies in a simple monetary
model with capital accumulation and credit con-
straints, in which I embed fiscal and monetary
policies.
Perhaps the closest article is Leeper (1991).
However, it differs along several dimensions: In
particular, I do not impose a single budget con-
straint for the fiscal and monetary authorities. On
the contrary, I assume that the government budget
is balanced and that the central bank chooses its
own policy rule. Fiscal policy consists of setting
the tax rate on labor income while monetary pol-
icy decides on the nominal interest rate (and
maybe lump-sum transfers). Also, unlike Leeper’s
(1991) model, my model incorporates physical
capital accumulation and borrowing constraints.
As in Leeper (1991) and Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (1997), I focus on policies that maintain a
constant level of public spending over time,
which may be justified by assuming that the
government wishes to smooth out the production
of public goods. Moreover, this hypothesis some-
what captures in a simple way the fact that public
expenditures are much less volatile than output
or factor income. Lane (2003; Table 1, p. 2669),
for instance, reports some evidence suggesting
that total government consumption has been
acyclical in most Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries
over the period 1960-98. What turns out to be a
key assumption here is that public spending is
predetermined when private agents make their
own decisions, rather than when public spend-
ing is constant over time. Similar to Antinolfi,
Azariadis, and Bullard (2007), some agents are
subject to borrowing constraints. However, in the
present article, credit-constrained households
choose to hold outside money. Finally, Antinolfi,
Azariadis, and Bullard (2007) abstract from both
money and fiscal policy, in contrast with this
article.
Unlike the conditions in Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (1997), in the present article indeterminacy
Pintus
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spending. In addition, the steady state is unique
in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) and is associ-
ated, when locally indeterminate, with a tax rate
that is lower than the Laffer maximum. In contrast,
my result shows that indeterminacy and expec-
tation-driven business cycles arise because there
exists a low, Pareto-dominated steady state, where
the tax rate is higher than the Laffer maximum.
The existence of such a Laffer trap calls for, in the
setting of this article, a Pareto-improving, active
monetary policy that cannot be implemented in
the non-monetary economy of Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (1997). However, much of the sensitivity
analysis of these authors applies to this article,
where, for instance, adding government debt does
not alter the results as long as the balanced-budget
requirement is maintained.
The monetary economy I focus on may be
seen as an extension of Sargent and Wallace
(1981), with capital accumulation and heteroge-
nous agents. As in the analysis of these authors,
the low steady state may be indeterminate. The
model is also close to a commonly used frame-
work in the public finance literature (see, e.g.,
Judd, 1985; Kemp, Van Long, and Shimomura,
1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; and Lansing,
1999). This article adds to the public finance




In this section, I briefly present Woodford’s
(1986) model, to which I add government expen-
ditures, distortionary labor taxes (as in Gokan,
2006, and Pintus, 2006), and monetary policy.
The economy consists of two types of agents (say,
workers and producers), who consume and have
perfect foresight during their infinite lifetimes.
Workers consume the produced good and supply
a variable quantity of labor in each period. More-
over, they face a financial constraint that prevents
them from borrowing from their labor income.
On the other hand, producers consume and save
in each period, and, most importantly, they are
assumed to be more patient than workers (that is,
they have a larger discount factor). As a conse-
quence, producers end up holding the entire capi-
tal stock (as in Becker, 1980), whereas workers
own the whole stock of outside money (which is
a dominated asset) at the steady state and nearby.
In such a framework, Woodford (1986) has shown
that although workers are infinitely long-lived,
they behave like two-period living agents. More
precisely, workers save their wage income in the
form of money today, to be consumed tomorrow.
I should emphasize that what I now present is the
reduced-form model that is equivalent, near the
steady state, to the infinite-horizon setting. (See
the appendix.) The reader is referred to Woodford
(1986) and Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder
(1998) for more details on the derivation of this
equivalence. In summary, what is key here is that
workers are both more impatient and unable to
borrow.
A key assumption of the analysis is that a
constant flow of public expenditures, g > 0 in real
terms, has to be financed in each period t ≥ 0.
This flow can be interpreted as purchases of the
final good produced in the economy, which is in
turn obtained by combining labor, lt > 0, and the
capital stock, kt > 0, resulting from the previous
period. The government levies distortionary labor
income taxes under a strict rule that imposes a
balanced budget. Therefore, the tax rate 0 < τt < 1
adjusts to meet the constraint that g = τtˉtlt in all
periods. For simplicity, I abstract from both capital
income taxation (see Judd, 1985, for a justifica-
tion) and public debt, although results would be
similar with fixed government debt and a constant
capital tax rate.
Production possibilities are given by Cobb-
Douglas technology, F￿kt,lt￿ = kt
slt
1–s. Competitive
firms take real rental prices of capital and labor
as given and, accordingly, the real wage is ˉt =
ˉ￿kt/lt￿￿￿ 1 – s￿￿kt/lt￿
s; and the real gross return
on capital is Rt = R￿kt/lt￿￿s￿kt/lt￿
s–1 +1 –ʴ in
equilibrium, where 0 < ʴ < 1 is the depreciation
rate for capital.
As described in the appendix, the represen-
tative, infinitely long-lived worker chooses next-
period consumption, ct+1 > 0, and labor supply,
lt > 0, so as to maximize {U￿ct+1￿ – V￿lt￿} subject to
Pintus
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MAY/JUNE, PART 1 2008 167(1)
where σt+1 > 0 and Tt+1 represent, respectively,
the nominal interest rate on money balances and
lump-sum monetary transfers; pt+1 > 0 is the next-
period price of output (assumed to be perfectly
foreseen); and wt > 0 is the nominal wage (that is,
wt = ptˉt). The budget constraint in (1) incorpo-
rates the fact that workers save in period t their
disposable wage income in the form of money, to
be consumed in period t+1. That is, if mt+1 is
money demand in period t, then the budget con-
straint in (1) comes from ￿1 – τt￿wtlt = mt+1 and
pt+1ct+1 = ￿1 + σt+1￿mt+1 + pt+1Tt+1. The utility func-
tions U￿c￿ and V￿l￿ are increasing, respectively
concave and convex. Moreover, consumption and
leisure are assumed to be gross substitutes; that
is, U￿c￿ is not too concave. The first-order condi-
tion of (1) is then [ct+1 – Tt+1]U′￿ct+1￿ = ltV′￿lt￿,
together with pt+1ct+1 = ￿1 + σt+1￿￿1 – τt￿wtlt +
pt+1Tt+1.
Producers do not work, do not hold money,
and maximize the discounted sum of utilities
derived from the consumption in each period. In
period t, they consume (and save) part of their
capital income, Rtkt. If the producers’ utility func-
tion is logarithmic, then their optimal choice
simply maintains a constant savings rate; that is,
kt+1 = βRtkt, where 0 < β < 1 is the producers’ dis-
count factor (see Woodford, 1986).
Because workers save their wage income in the
form of money, the money market equilibrium is
(2)
where Mt+1 > 0 is money supply. I assume that
monetary creation takes the form of both propor-
tional and lump-sum transfers; that is, Mt+1 – Mt =
σtMt + ptTt.
How does monetary policy then affect the
competitive equilibrium of such an economy? The
next step in the analysis is to contrast two differ-
ent types of monetary policies. I call “passive” a
rule that keeps the money supply growing at a
constant rate and that uses only proportional
transfers (that is, Tt = 0) in all periods. It is passive
in the sense that it does not respond to the state
of the economy. In contrast, “active” monetary
rules allow the rate of money creation to depend
1 1 − ( ) = + τω tt t t t lM p ,
pc w l pT t tt t t t t t + ++ + + =+ ( ) − ( ) + 1 11 1 1 11 στ , on the state of the economy and may lead to dif-
ferent dynamics, as I now show. More precisely,
the two policies are as follows: A passive policy
is such that σt = σ is constant and Tt = 0,
whereas an active policy sets Mt = M constant
and chooses a sequence for σt and Tt = –σtM/pt.
Note that the above terminology differs some-
what from Leeper’s (1991) definition of passive/
active monetary policy, which is helpful to
describe an economy hit by exogenous shocks.
In particular, all the rules that I examine here do
not depend in an explicit way on either past or
expected inflation rates. Consequently, one would
label them as passive according to the usage that





Suppose first that monetary authorities com-
mit to constant money growth and use propor-
tional transfers only. In other words, σt = σ and
Tt = 0 in all periods. When σ is small, one may
interpret this rule as resulting from high aversion
to inflation. Using the budget constraint (1) and
the money market equilibrium (2) with Tt = 0,
Mt+1/Mt = ￿1+σ￿￿1 – τt￿ˉtlt/ct. If monetary author-
ities fix the growth rate of the money supply at
1 +σ = Mt+1/Mt (by controlling the nominal inter-
est rate on money holdings), then ct = ￿1 – τt￿ˉtlt.
Moreover, by defining u￿c￿￿cU′￿c￿, v￿l￿￿lV′￿l￿,
and ʳ ￿l￿￿u
–1[v￿l￿], the first-order condition
ct+1U′￿ct+1￿ = ltV′￿lt￿ can conveniently be written
as ct+1 = ʳ￿lt￿, where ʳ￿l￿ is increasing and convex.
Therefore, workers’ first-order condition is, in
equilibrium, described by ￿1 – τt+1￿ˉt+1lt+1 = ʳ￿lt￿
or, given that g = τt+1ˉt+1lt+1, described by ˉt+1lt+1 =
ʳ￿lt￿ + g. Then, from the above equilibrium con-
ditions, one easily deduces that all variables are
known once the pair ￿lt,kt￿ and g are given. Note,
however, that σ does not affect the dynamics:
That is, predetermined proportional transfers are
neutral (see Grandmont, 1986). This implies that
intertemporal equilibria may be summarized by
Pintus
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is a jump variable) and the (predetermined) capi-
tal stock, once fiscal policy is announced. In sum-
mary, an intertemporal, competitive equilibrium
with perfect foresight is a sequence of positive
numbers ￿lt,kt￿ for every period t ≥ 0 such that,
given government spending g > 0 and the initial
capital stock k0 > 0,
(3)
where the equations in (3) are to be remembered
as the first-order conditions of, respectively,
workers and producers.
It is then not difficult to derive the conditions
that any steady state must satisfy. From the second









￿ = 1/β, which has
a unique solution under the assumption of Cobb-





by both technology and producers’ patience, but
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￿, in view of the first condi-
tion in (3). It is straightforward to show that the
latter equality—which determines steady-state
labor, capital, and output—has two solutions,
l
–




L as depicted in Figure 1, provided
that government spending is not too large.
As shown in Pintus (2006), the two steady
states are in fact Pareto-ranked. In essence, the
higher steady state produces larger income for
both types of agents. The corresponding tax rates









over, τL￿τH￿ is higher (lower) than the tax rate that
maximizes fiscal revenues (that is, the Laffer maxi-
mal tax rate). Let us focus on parameter values
such that, after linearizing (3) at steady states, the
lowest steady state is indeterminate while the
highest one is a saddle, as pictured in Figure 2.
(See also Gokan, 2006.) In view of the fact that (3)
represents the dynamics of the original economy
populated by heterogenous, infinitely long-lived
agents only near steady states, I now focus on
parameter configurations such that both steady
Pintus
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Figure 1
Two Pareto-Ranked Steady States When Monetary Policy Is Passivestates are “close”; that is, they belong to a small
neighborhood. Such cases are shown to arise
when parameter values approach some bifurca-
tion levels. (See Pintus, 2006, for details.)
In Figure 2, consider an initial capital stock,
k0 > 0, that is close enough to the low steady state,
k
–
L. Then there is a continuum, [l0
d,l0
u], of values
for labor such that the economy converges to
steady state. In period 0, if labor supply l0 happens
to be equal to the highest value, l0
u, then conver-
gence to the high-welfare steady state is ensured.
However, if today’s labor supply is below the level
l0
u and larger than some l0
d, then the economy falls
into the Laffer trap. In other words, infinitely
many values of labor supply are consistent, in
period 0, with convergence to some steady state.
Similarly, if k0 is close to (but lower than) k
–
H, the
economy may end up converging either to the
high steady state or to the Laffer trap. There is
indeterminacy.
In summary, suppose that government spend-
ing, g, is not too large and that money growth is
constant in all periods. Then the economy

















L (see Figure 1),










“Laffer trap”) is associated with a tax rate that is





is associated with a tax rate that is lower than the









L￿ is indeterminate and subject to
expectation-driven business cycles (see Figure 2).
Therefore, the economy may occasionally switch,
because of self-fulfilling expectations, from the
neighborhood of the Laffer trap to the saddle-path
leading to the high-welfare steady state.
The configuration that appears in Figure 2
turns out to be plausible, as it arises when govern-
ment spending is (arbitrarily) small, in contrast
with findings in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997).
In their analysis, the steady state is unique and
is associated, when indeterminate, with a (large
enough) tax rate that is lower than the Laffer maxi-
Pintus
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Figure 2
The Low Steady State (the Laffer Trap) Is Indeterminate and the High Steady State Is a Saddle
When Monetary Policy Is Passivemum. In contrast, my result shows that indeter-
minacy and belief-driven business cycles arise
because there exists a low, Pareto-dominated
steady state, where the tax rate is higher than the
Laffer maximum. This is reminiscent of earlier
results obtained by Sargent and Wallace (1981) in
a monetary economy without capital. The exis-
tence of such a Laffer trap calls, in the setting of
thisarticle,foraPareto-improving,activemonetary
policy that is assumed away in the non-monetary
economy of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997).
Most importantly, regime switching occurs
in Figure 2, when the economy abruptly jumps
between paths converging monotonically toward
the high steady state and volatile paths around
the low steady state. The main mechanism giving
rise to indeterminacy is that households supply
labor today according to their expectations about
the inflation rate. More precisely, labor supply is
higher (lower) when expected inflation is lower
(higher). Therefore, waves of optimism or pes-
simism turn out to be self-confirming and the
economy experiences excess volatility in the
absence of any shocks to “fundamentals.” The
assumption of predetermined public spending is
as important here as it is in Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (1997): This amounts to imposing a fixed
cost on the economy, thereby creating a mecha-
nism that is likely to lead, in a similar fashion as
increasing returns do, to multiple equilibria and
indeterminacy. In that respect, adding government
debt to the model would not change the results, as
long as the tax rate adjusts to balance the fiscal
budget.
The multiplicity of steady states turns out to
be robust also with respect to the introduction of
lump-sum monetary transfers. Assume instead
that money is held constant over time (Mt = M);
that is, Tt = –σtMt/pt. Then the first-order condi-
tion of the workers becomes ￿1 + σ￿ct+1U′￿ct+1￿ =
ltV′￿lt￿. Consequently, increasing (decreasing)
the rate of money transfer σ shifts down (up) the
ʳ￿l
–
￿ locus in Figure 1, which cannot rule out the
Laffer trap.
Active Monetary Rules
The main point of this article is to argue that
an active monetary policy may rule out the Laffer
trap equilibrium that is associated with active
fiscal policy when that fiscal policy operates
under a strict balanced budget requirement. One
may think about this second policy regime as
motivated by inflation targeting, which is designed
to avoid large fluctuations of the inflation rate
associated with indeterminacy. As illustrated in
Figure 2, fluctuations between paths converging
monotonically toward the high steady-state and
volatile paths around the Laffer trap are associ-
ated with large swings in the inflation rate. This
is because the inflation rate, given by
moves together with lt and kt in the above case
with passive monetary policy.
Alternatively, one may interpret this regime
as originated by a max-min criterion that guides
monetary policy and that aims at ruling out the
“bad” equilibrium. The idea here is that monetary
authorities are concerned about a “worst-case
scenario” in which the economy would wander
around a low-welfare steady state. In other words,
monetary policy tries to avoid the low equilibrium
because it is Pareto-dominated in terms of both
welfare level and welfare volatility.
As an example of such rules, set 1 + σt+1 =
v￿lt￿/u￿Aˈ￿lt￿￿ and Tt = –σtMt/pt. Then workers’
first-order condition becomes ￿1 + σt+1￿u￿ct+1￿ =
v￿lt￿ or ct+1 = Aˈ￿lt￿. Figure 3 depicts a case such
that Aˈ￿l￿ is increasing and convex, with
Aˈ￿l￿ > 0 only when l > l, for some l > g/ˉ
–
. In
addition, the scaling factor A should be appropri-
ately chosen so that the high equilibrium is the
unique steady state (see Figure 3). Then intertem-
poral equilibria are now given by
(4)
and it is readily shown, by linearizing (4), that
the unique steady state remains a saddle point
under such a rule. In other words, suppose that
government spending, g, is not too large and that
the rate of proportional monetary transfers, σt,
follows a rule such that σt+1 = ˆ￿lt￿ in all periods.
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H￿. In other words,
such a monetary policy rules out expectation-
driven business cycles and implies saddle-path
convergence to the Pareto-dominating steady
state. Note that both money creation and inflation
vanish at steady state; that is, σ tends toward zero
along the transition to steady state.
Obviously, one may interpret more generally
the above rules as relating the nominal interest
rate to output, rather than labor, given the capital
stock in the current period. In that case, money
creation in period t+1 is made an increasing
function of period-t output. The main intuition
here is that when the nominal interest rate is
announced to be an increasing function of output,
this neutralizes self-confirming expectations
about the inflation rate.
CONCLUSION
If fiscal policy is constrained by a strict
balanced-budget requirement, a Laffer trap equi-
librium coexists with a Pareto-dominating steady
state. The Laffer trap equilibrium features a higher
tax rate, lower and volatile macroeconomic vari-
ables, and hence lower welfare. Its mere existence
makes regime switching possible, when monetary
policy is passive, because the economy may
abruptly jump from the saddle-path converging
toward the high-welfare steady state to volatile
paths around the low-welfare steady state. Such
a pattern is associated with large swings in the
inflation rate. The analysis of this article suggests
that one way to push the economy toward the
“good” steady state is to abandon passive mone-
tary policies and adopt instead an active monetary
rule. Such an active rule may take the form of a
commitment to link in a positive fashion the
nominal interest rate and the level of aggregate
output. Under this commitment, welfare is higher
in every period and expectation-driven business
cycles are ruled out.
Directions for future research would be to
consider, in a more systematic way, the effect of
fiscal rules that aim at both redistributing income
Pintus
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Figure 3
The Unique (High Welfare) Steady State with Active Monetary Policyand stabilizing the economy, building on recent
contributions by Christiano and Harrison (1999),
Guo and Harrison (2001), Aloi, Lloyd-Braga, and
Whitta-Jacobsen (2003), and Dupor (2005), among
many others. This is most important in view of
the fact that the existing results, taken together,
are rather inconclusive and suggest that the cycli-
cality of government expenditures and taxes may
or may not stabilize the economy, depending on
the precise framework. The relevance of such a
question for actual policy also originates from the
available data, which show that the level of fiscal
cyclicality varies much across OECD countries,
as documented by Lane (2003), for instance. This
article suggests that when it comes to assessing the
impact of active fiscal policies, it is important to
understand how they interact with independent
monetary policies that may be active or passive.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, I derive the condition under which the decision of workers reduces to a two-period
problem. Workers’ intertemporal utility is
(5)
where 0 < α < 1 is their discount factor. Workers face the usual budget constraint
(6)
In addition, they cannot borrow and face an intratemporal liquidity constraint such that
(7)
It is not difficult to verify, by manipulating the first-order conditions, that workers do not hold
capital (that is, kt = 0) at all dates if
(8)
As the liquidity constraint (7) binds at steady states, condition (8) implies the following: Workers
spend their money holdings, i.e., ptct = ￿1 + σt￿mt + ptTt, and save their wage income in the form of
money, i.e., ￿1 – τt￿wtlt = mt+1, to be consumed tomorrow. Under (8), therefore, workers choose lt and
ct+1 so as to maximize
(9)
as described in the text. Finally, under the assumption that producers discount the future less heavily
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